In 1814, in the midst of a series of Bahian slave insurrections, a group of Hausa slaves initiated yet another scheme to gain their freedom. Earlier in that year at Itapoá on
the outskirts of Salvador, a group of 250 or so had risen under the direction of a Muslim religious leader or *malam*, burning the installations at a whaling station and devastating a number of plantations before a force of government cavalry could check their movement. A second revolt among the Hausas sprang up in March, 1814 in the sugar growing areas of the nearby agricultural zone of the Recôncavo before it too was suppressed, but the Hausas continued to conspire on how to win their freedom. A new plot was hatched among urban slave dockworkers and freed artisans in July, but they realized that to have any chance of success they needed to gain the support of the plantation slaves and of other groups who might potentially be their allies. Local maroon communities were brought into the planned revolt. To this end, they also contacted Indians in the region who they supposed would join them in revolt because, as the slaves believed, these Indians, "wanted their land that the Portuguese had taken from them." Representatives of Indian groups even arrived in Salvador to speak with the plotters, but they were quickly sent away. Their presence would have raised suspicions among the authorities since Indians by the beginning of the 19th century were an uncommon sight in the city. Nevertheless, the realization by the slave conspirators of shared grievances with the Indian peoples of the region, and the willingness of the latter to consider the possibility of collaboration with African slaves against the colonial regime, underlined the political awareness of both and the ironies of their historical relationship.¹

Interaction and contacts between indigenous peoples and
diaspora Africans is one of the least studied and understood aspects of the history of the Americas. What little we do know strongly reflects the interests of the colonial regimes. Thus what Blacks and Indians thought of each other is particularly difficult to rediscover since the documentation of their relationship is sparse and always filtered through the gaze of colonial observers.

In Brazil, Blacks and Indians had much in common during the colonial regime. Both groups had been enslaved and both suffered in the creation of the Portuguese colony and from the occupation of the land and the regime of export agriculture. But the parallel sufferings and tribulations of Afro-Brazilians and Native Americans was only part of the story of their interaction because the Portuguese crown and colonists had also deployed the two groups in such a way as to foster hostility and rivalry between them, often to the benefit of the colonial regime or the European settlers and their descendants.

The complex dyadic relationship between Afro-Brazilians and Native Americans can not be understood by itself, but only within the context of the relationship of both these groups to European society and the colonial regime. Thus, even when contacts took place and relationships, whether friendly or hostile, were formed between Afro-Brazilians and indigenous peoples, white society was constantly a kind of specter, a Banquo's ghost, always present and ever watchful. This was a reality that was implicitly understood, but not usually commented upon by contemporaries, and Afro-Brazilians, Native Americans, and the Portuguese all developed strategies within that context to deal with the complexity of
forms that these relationships could take.

We must first examine the colonial process of ethnic labeling and the hierarchy that it came to instantiate. The colonial regime demonstrated a proclivity for creating new social categories and spaces in which the language of birth, hereditary status, color, religion, and perceived moral condition contributed the creation of these ethnic or pseudo-racial categories and their ascribed attributes. Thus the term "índios" (Indians) or the other terms that were commonly used in Brazil, such as gentios (gentiles), bárbaros (barbarians), tapuyos (non-Tupi-speakers), or caboclos (rustics) were chronologically and regionally variable labels of Portuguese origin, created as points of reference to place these peoples within the hierarchical order of colonial society. A similar process also characterized dealing with Africans, but Portuguese attitudes toward them had already been determined to some extent by prior contacts in Africa from the Fifteenth Century. Whatever the tendencies to deal diplomatically with African states and benignly with those rulers who converted to Christianity, these positive attitudes were undercut in practice by the servile status of most Africans that the Portuguese encountered. That situation led to an attitude of deprecation of Blacks who were associated with slave status. The term negro itself implied a servile condition and was often--but not always--used as a synonym for slave. Thus the commonly used label for indigenous people in Sixteenth century Brazil, negros da terra "Blacks of the land" revealed a perception of them in a servile status, more or less equivalent to Africans who were called,
"negros de Guiné." Later, in 1757, the Indian mission villages in the Amazon region were secularized in the Directory system, the "unjust and scandalous" practice of calling Indians, "Negros," implying thereby their servitude, was specifically prohibited. In parallel fashion, the first Africans brought to Brazil were sometimes called by the Portuguese, tapanhuns, a word of Tupi origin that was employed as a quasi-tribal designation. Both the terms negros da terra and tapanhuns disappeared as Indian slavery was replaced and large numbers of Africans arrived in the colony. While these categories tended to disappear or to be transformed over time, the process of contact between Blacks and Indians did produce a progeny of mixed origin called regionally cafusos, curibocas, or caborés. In their own way, these new peoples and new categories further complicated the system of racial hierarchy in the colony.

**Confrontation and Hostility**

From the early stages of the Portuguese conquest and settlement of Brazil there were good reasons for hostility between Afro-Brazilians and Native Americans. As Black slaves began to arrive in some numbers after the 1560s, Indians were increasingly used as a means of controlling them. This function was simply an extension of the use of "tame" or allied Indians as protection against "unreduced" indigenous peoples or against foreign interlopers like the French. The Portuguese, like other colonial powers in the New World promoted a system of "ethnic soldering," turning some groups into a military force to patrol the territorial and social boundaries of the colony. This policy had
begun in the 1520s if not before, and after the arrival of the Jesuits in 1549, the mobilization system was constructed using both independent allied groups as well as Indians in the aldeias, or missionary-controlled villages. Portuguese policy had the effect of aggrandizing some "tribes" and creating new identities for those in the mission villages. The ability to mobilize Indians for this purpose as well as to deliver them as a labor force to crown and colonists became a standard argument of the missionaries in their justification for control of Indians.

The use of indigenous peoples as a military force on the peripheries of empire as "ethnic soldiers," was common in the Americas and the Portuguese were among the first of Europeans to employ it effectively. The technique was developed early on the Brazilian littoral, but then extended across the continent as occupation and settlement expanded. Anthropologist Neil Whitehead has pointed out, such policies had the effect of creating and sharpening "tribal" divisions and hostilities among indigenous peoples and of mobilizing them against European rivals. In colonies where Africans constituted a significant slave population, ethnic soldering also became a key element in controlling and policing Africans.4

In the struggle between the Jesuit missionaries and the Portuguese colonists for control of "domesticated" Indians, both sides argued that they were best able to mobilize the potential labor and the military usefulness of those indigenous peoples under Portuguese control. From the 1580s, Jesuit observers made this point consistently, emphasizing "the service performed for
God and Your Majesty by converting and domesticating those gentiles." The Jesuit provincial in 1601 in celebrating his Order's service in the pacification of the Potiguars of Rio Grande and Pernambuco claimed that over 50,000 in 150 villages had been brought under Portuguese control by Jesuit efforts. He argued that:

with the great obedience that the gentio of Brazil have for these Religious that it is to be expected not only their conversion to our holy faith, but also great service to Your Majesty, helping to defend those areas from the French and English who infest them and from the Guiné Blacks who rebel, and from Indians that resist.\(^5\)

In their struggle against enslavement of Indians, the Jesuits emphasized that such a policy would drive indigenous peoples from the coast and create a vacuum that would allow black slaves, "to rise with the whole coast as they have attempted in some places with great danger to the Portuguese who in order to defend themselves turn to the Brazis who are the walls and bulwarks [emphasis mine] of that state according to the Portuguese that live there.\(^6\) This metaphor of domesticated Indians as a protective barrier or wall was repeated throughout the colony's history.

This idea of using Indians as both a potential labor force and as a defensive cordon appealed to the colonists and sugar planters as well as the missionaries. In 1603, the absentee donatary of Porto Seguro, the Duke of Aveiro, complained that his holdings in Brazil did not prosper because he lacked "gentiles who could populate and defend them." Despite legislation that privileged the Jesuits, he asked for, and received, permission for colonists in his captaincy to bring Indians from the interior for
this purpose. Similar arguments were made by other sugar planters and by royal officials as well, but in general crown policy supported control by the Jesuits.

As the numbers of African and Afro-Brazilian workers increased on the northeastern plantations after the 1560s, the planters, the Jesuits, and the colonial state all increasingly came to view "domesticated" Indians as an essential element of colonial control and essential for the colony's success. Frei Vicente do Salvador, Brazil's first historian, claimed that the depredations of marauding bands of rebellious slaves was only limited by their fear of Indians. In the late Sixteenth century as colonists and Jesuits competed for control of the Indians under Portuguese control, each side justified its stewardship by arguing that it were best suited to mobilize Indians as a defensive force against the threat of foreign interlopers like the French or the Dutch on the coast, the unreduced tribes of the interior, or "domestic enemies," the slaves of the growing number of sugar plantations. In Bahia, for example, the Jesuits argued that their aldeias or mission towns of Santo António in Jaguaripe and São Sebastião in Capenema had been established and developed because they stood on the frontier with the hostile Aimorés, an indigenous people who had kept the southern areas of the captaincy in constant danger. The Jesuits had made the service of their charges available to the colonial state. In 1614, Indians from the Jesuit aldeia of São João had been mobilized to destroy a runaway slave community in the Bahian interior. The colonists, anxious to control Indian labor and no less anxious to have
auxiliaries to be used against still hostile groups and against
slaves argued against the Jesuit villages and against Jesuit
control of the Indians. In 1610, for example, the town council of
Paraíba contested legislation designed to end enslavement of
Indians and noted the great value Indians provided to the crown as
workers and as a counterbalance to the enslaved Africans, the so-
called, negros de Guiné. The councilors argued that those
enslaved were cannibals who had joined with "Lutherans" (the
French) to attack the Portuguese and that the Jesuit aldeias had
only made the Indians more susceptible to sickness. In this last
particular they were probably correct, but their concern was more
with the services the Indians could provide, then with their
health. Both Jesuits and colonists agreed on the utility of the
domesticated Indians, they only differed on who might best
mobilize them. Diogo de Campos Moreno who prepared a report for
the crown in 1612 on the state of Brazil was greatly in favor of
the integration of indigenous people into the fabric of colonial
society. As he stated: "the Indians that live together with the
Whites are not only better Christians, raising themselves and
their children as such, but they also learned the mechanic trades
and give benefit to the royal treasury and great assistance in the
use of arms on every occasion on the coast and in the interior
(sertão) of their lands." This defensive function of colonial
"Indians," along with their potential as a labor force was
manipulated by both the colonial settlers and by the Jesuits. The
struggle between the contending sides became a theme throughout
much of the history of colonial Brazil. What was not in
contention, however, was the perceived value of the Indians as a
defensive bulwark and a counterweight to the growing population of
enslaved Africans. This was made particularly apparent by a
petition of a group of settlers from the Jaguaripe region of Bahia
who in 1613 sought the king's intervention when they complained
that the Jesuits had moved their missionary villages away from the
frontier where these settlers had their sugar mills and farms and
these Indian bowmen had served to guard the frontier and to
control the "black captives" who might rise or flee and join with
the French and other enemies. In 1633, Duarte Gomes de Silveira,
representing the colonists of Paraíba penned a long memorial on
the use of Indians to control the growing number of Africans. He
put the matter clearly:

There is no doubt that without Indians in Brazil there
can be no Guinea blacks, or better said, there can be no Brazil,
for without the Blacks nothing can be done, and they are ten times
more numerous than the whites; and if now it is costly to control
them with the Indians who they greatly fear. . . . what will happen
without the Indians? The next day they will rebel, and it is a
difficult task to overcome domestic enemies."

This theme of the utility of indigenous troops for the defense of
Brazil against foreign and domestic enemies was continually
repeated. In 1697, for example, Father Pero Rodrigues of the
Company of Jesus claimed that the three principal enemies of the
Portuguese were the French, the unconquered Aimoré Indians, and
the Blacks in quilombos, and that the best defense against all of
them was the use of aldeia Indians, that is, Indians under the
guidance of the missionaries.

The mobilization of Indians by the state, usually under the
direction of the Jesuits, for the purposes of slave control was
paralleled by their employment under other arrangements as well. Indians were often used as slave catchers by plantation owners on an individual basis. We have some indication of how the contractual arrangements worked from the entries in the yearly account registers maintained at Engenho Sergipe do Conde, one of the largest Bahian sugar estates. Entries in these records speak of payments in small sums as well as shirts, rum, knives, and trinkets paid to Indians for various tasks including the capture and return of runaway slaves. Entries such as one for the harvest of 1629-30: "for money given to three Indians for tying up a Black woman who had run off;" or for the that of 1630-31, "to some Indians who captured three Blacks escaped from the fazenda," highlight the nature of the relationship.16

Indigenous peoples became a force for the control of the Afro-Brazilian slave population in two ways. First, the unreduced groups of the Brazilian interior created a kind of barrier for both whites and Blacks, limiting the extension of colonial control, but also creating an obstacle for the formation of runaway communities. This situation along with the predatory economies of many of these escapee villages probably contributed to the fact that most of the runaway communities remained relatively close to the plantations and urban centers of settlement. The fact that "untamed" Indians provided a barrier to both Blacks and whites did not prevent colonial authorities from contemplating the function of "hostile" groups as a means of slave control. In a letter probably written around 1687, authorities in
Pernambuco, anxious to eliminate the great runaway community of Palmares, called not only for the localization of domesticated Indians and members of the Indian regiment of Henrique Camarao in the region of Palmares as a means of control, but also the use of "wild Indians (gentios bravos)." The strategy they suggested reveals colonial perceptions of how the problem could be handled:

There is also much to consider that the wild Indians that surround Palmares and all the mocambos of Blacks are their bitterest enemies, and wish not only to destroy them, but to eat them; and with these gentiles it is possible to enter into communication and to persuade them to go against the Blacks offering them aguardente, knives, and other things; and the Blacks, surrounded and in this way squeezed between the gentiles of the interior and our forces from the seashore, will wish to surrender rather than die.17

This strategy was somewhat unrealistic and difficult to accomplish. Much more feasible was the employment of "domestic Indians," those who had been brought under Portuguese control and settled in Jesuit aldeias or in lay-controlled villages that provided a readily-available force for controlling the slave population. Sometimes Indian groups were moved long distances for this purpose. In the late 1590s, 800 bowmen from the powerful Tupian-speaking Potiguars of Pernambuco, who had aided the Portuguese against the French, were sent to southern Bahia to provide protection against the raids of the Aimorés. By the time they arrived, the principal threat had passed and they were eventually distributed not only in Ilhéus, but in the Bahian sugar zone of the Recôncavo as a labor and military force. Some, under their chief Zorobabé, were then deployed against a mocambo of escaped blacks on the Itapicuru river. Zorobabé then sold some of
those he captured for a horse, clothing, and military trappings.\textsuperscript{18}

While it is difficult to measure the effectiveness of the policy of using Indians to control African rebelliousness and insurrection, the lack of large-scale revolts up to the early Nineteenth century suggests that the proximity of Indians did have some influence, but if such movements were lacking, there was no lack of individual flight and runaways. The military use of "domesticated" Indians, especially to suppress slave resistance found its most common form in their employment as scouts, bearers, and auxiliary troops in campaigns to stamp out runaway slave communities, usually called in Brazil mocambos or quilombos. Virtually every maroon community in Brazil was attacked or destroyed with the help of Indians under Portuguese command.

A major feature in the anti-mocambo measures was the creation of a force of slave catchers, or "bush captains." These officers, called variously capitão do campo, capitão do mato, capitão dos assalto, were, often themselves Black or mulatto freedmen, but they generally operated with the support of Indian auxiliaries. As early as 1612, the governor of Brazil received a request to create a capitão do campo in all of the eight parishes of Pernambuco. Each of these officials were to have twenty Indian families under his control to help with their slave-capturing activities.\textsuperscript{19} Similar arrangements became standard practice throughout many areas of Brazil. In the 1660s, for example, the Count of Obidos as Governor of the colony, organized a series of campaigns against mocambos in which Indians from the Torre de Garcia d'Avila, from the aldeia of Santo Antonio, and even some veterans of the Indian
regiment of Henrique Camarão were to be employed.\textsuperscript{20}

The idea that lay beneath the employment of Indians and freed blacks as slave catchers and as a bulwark against unreduced Indians and fugitive slaves, was that only such forces could be effective in the kind of guerrilla war that such actions implied. In a projected expedition mounted in the 1590s that would use Potiguar warriors from Pernambuco against the Aimoré of Ilhéus, it was generally agreed that the campaign was impossible, "unless it was [done] with other Indians, forest beings (bicho do mato) like them." Similar arguments were made throughout the colony's existence. The Portuguese Overseas Council discussing the need to subdue the region of Mato Grosso agreed in 1744, for example, that, "the proper people to make war against gentiles are other gentiles along with some whites, and the Bororo because of their bravery and loyalty are the best for this."\textsuperscript{21} Similar arguments were made for employing Indians or freed Blacks, against escaped Afro-Brazilian slaves. In a self-congratulatory letter of c. 1695, Domingos Jorge Velho, the leader of the expedition that defeated Palmares, claimed that his troops were the most effective against maroons because of the martial skills of the gentio, under his command, and that the Paulistas and their Indians would be like the Great Wall of China against hostile Indians and fugitive blacks, except that they would be more effective and less subject to the forces of nature than the famous Asian fortification.\textsuperscript{22}

But such policies were not without difficulties and risks. We can use a Bahian anti-mocambo campaign of 1636 as an example of ways in which Indian forces could be mobilized against runaway
communities, but also of the dangers inherent in doing so. In 1636, the Governor of Brazil and the town council of Salvador mounted an expedition to suppress a large and apparently well-organized maroon community in the Bahian interior. Forces were raised in various locales and Indians from Jesuit villages as well as those under secular leadership were enlisted. Many slaves were recaptured and then sold or redeemed thus generating a large sum of money to be divided among the members of the expedition. These included Afonso Rodrigues, "captain of his Indians," and Luís de Cerqueira, captain of the Aldeia, who received 80 milréis to be divided among the Indians who participated. Half of that sum went to the Jesuit representative to be divided among 82 Indians from the Jesuit aldeias and smaller amounts went to Cerqueira and Rodrigues for the Indians under their command.²³

This expedition also revealed the difficulties and contingencies of such techniques. As part of the expedition, Rubellio Dias had led his "people," who he described as "gentio and tapuyos," that is unconverted non-Tupi-speaking heathens into the interior. They had encountered a large body of Blacks or Tapanhunos and a fierce fight ensued. Many of the maroons were killed or wounded and forty taken prisoner including their leaders.²⁴ All were taken back to the mocambo but there was no jail in the encampment where the prisoners could be kept securely, and Dias feared his own Tapuyos who he called "savages" who were also becoming ill. He was forced to deal with the mocambo leader who promised to bring into camp those fugitives still free in the forest. This he did, but the Indians and Dias himself sickened and
eventually Dias had to seek further Indian auxiliaries drawn from villages in Sergipe de-El Rey to the north.

The pattern of using Indian troops as guides, auxiliaries, and as ethnic soldiers forming the bulk of anti-mocambo forces became standard practice in Brazil. Frei Vicente do Salvador, Brazil's first historian wrote that the only reason the depredations of escaped slaves were not even worse was "the fear that they have of the Indians who with a Portuguese captain seek them out and returns them to their masters." In Bahia and Pernambuco such tactics had been employed from the Sixteenth Century forward, and by the Eighteenth century a regular system of mobilizing settled Indians for this purpose was firmly in place. The mocambo called "The Armadillo's Hole (Buraco de Tatu)" in Itapoá just north of Salvador was destroyed in 1764 using Indian auxiliaries from a village of Jaguaripe as well as a militia unit of Indians. In 1789, when fifty of the three hundred slaves at Engenho Santana in Ilheús ran off and formed a mocambo, the owner at first tried to return them to "their destiny" by peaceful means, but then sought the aid of the local capítães do matto along with the Indians of their villages of Barcelos and Olivença. In 1806, near the Rio das Contas in Ilheús the quilombo of Oitizeiro was destroyed by the "tropa da Conquista do gentio Bárbaro da Pedra Branca," a contingent of Kiriri Indians under the command of António Andrade e Conceição. These two well-documented Bahian cases are simply representative of the general pattern found throughout the other captaincies of the colony. In Rio de Janeiro, for example, where Jesuit aldeias had been created
in the Sixteenth century, Indians continually provided a number of services to the state as laborers and as a force for defense. In 1649, Salvador Correa de Sá, the most powerful figure in Southern Brazil, called the Indians of the Jesuit villages, "a salutary remedy against runaway slaves." During the Eighteenth century, Indians from the village of São Francisco Xavier de Itinga served as slave catchers for the large estate of Fazenda Santa Cruz nearby.  

This policy was not always successful. In the mining zones of Minas Gerais in south-central Brazil, early governors had sought to emulate the coastal captaincies by creating a network of bush captains in the 1720s and by using Indians as slave catchers and auxilliary troops, but these measures proved unsuccessful in face of the vast extent of territory, the rapidly growing slave population, and the relatively small number of "tame" Indians in the region. The Count of Assumar, governor of Minas Gerais, commented on the failure of Indian villages to stop the runaways in 1717, and soon thereafter he began to institute a series of draconian measures and punishments to stop runaways.  

In other areas as well the changing demography of the colonial which usually included large-scale declines or dislocations of indigenous populations had the effect of limiting the usefulness of Indians as a control on the African and Afro-Brazilian populations.

The patterns of relationships that developed on the Brazilian littoral and in Minas Gerais repeated themselves in the Brazilian
North and the West. The chronology of indigenous-Black relations, however, reflected the realities of the distribution of population. In the Maranhão, for example, the very low levels of the slave trade prior to 1680 meant that there were few Africans or Afro-Brazilians and thus little opportunity for interaction or hostility between Blacks and Native Americans simply because there were so few Blacks. Economic expansion in the state of Maranhão and a rise in the slave trade in the region changed that situation. As the occupation of the Brazilian interior increased in the Eighteenth Century and population moved into previously uncolonized areas, the institution of slavery was also diffused, and with it, runaways. In the captaincy of Goiás in the Brazilian Far West, the mining economy near Vila Boa and other mining sites attracted migrants, both slave and free, after the 1720s. By 1780, no settled region of the captaincy had a Black population that was less than 45% of the total inhabitants. But Portuguese settlers and prospectors as well as escaped slaves all had to contend with hostile indigenous groups. Tupi-speaking Carijós, fleeing Paulista slaving raids had reformed in Goiás as a new ethnicity called Avá-Canoeiros and opposed any encroachment on their territory. Other groups like the Gê-speaking Krahó, Xavante and Caiapó also constituted a barrier to both Black and white penetration of parts of the captaincy. These groups were especially active in destroying quilombos. Whereas colonial society had the power to pursue indigenous raiders or negotiate for the return of captives, those alternatives were essentially closed to Afro-Brazilian fugitives. A much closer parity of power existed between them and
Indian groups.

Similar conditions of conflict existed further north in Amazonia and to the west in Mato Grosso, a region which began to attract settlement in the 1720s after gold strikes in the region of Cuiabá. Fluvial expeditions, the famous monções, carrying people and supplies from São Paulo up the Paraguay River had to battle constantly against the attacks of the Paiaguá who resisted encroachment on their territory. By mid-century, settlement was regularized in the new captaincy of Mato Grosso (after 1748) around the two major towns of Cuiabá and Vila Bela. Settlers had brought Black slaves to work in mining and prospecting, truck farming, and in the construction of forts and military outposts on the frontier with Spanish America. By 1734, Cuiabá had a population of 3,000; 200 Whites, 800 Blacks, and the rest Indians. The natural outcome of this process was flight and resistance in the form of quilombos. Indigenous peoples resisted both the incursions of the colonists and the presence of escaped slaves, but that resistance was also balanced by the presence of Indians in many of the maroon communities.

Like the militarized international frontier between Florida and the Carolinas, the frontier regions of Brazil became places on considerable interaction and contestation, complicated somewhat by the presence of garrison troops and military deserters. On the north bank of the Amazon, in the Cabo Norte, today's Amapá, or what we could call the Brazilian Guiana, there was an international frontier zone with a sparse colonial population and a relatively large number of Indians. Indigenous peoples resisted
colonial settlement, but also the invasion of their territories by white military deserters and escaped Afro-Brazilian slaves. At the same time, colonial authorities and settlers employed both indigenous and African workers together. In 1765, for example, at the fort of Macapá, about 2600 Indians and 2400 slaves were employed. Of these about an equal percentage (1%) of both groups were listed as fugitives from service. In a frontier zone like the Cabo Norte where the ability to cross over to Caienne (French Guiana) or to sell products there offered fugitives various possibilities, control of runaways became a particularly important issue for colonial government. The basic fear on these frontiers in the Eighteenth century was much like that on the coast of northeastern Brazil in the Sixteenth century; that escaped slaves might unite with Indians to resist the colonial regime. Henrique João Wilckens after a visit to the Rio Negro region in 1800 wrote that there could be no greater danger than the "clandestine communication of the [settled] Indians with [unsubdued] gentiles and with mocambos" of escaped slaves. A similar situation existed in the Northwestern Amazon where the Dutch at Essequibo continually employed Carib-speakers to attack maroon communities, and where the problems of deserters and contraband in arms across the frontier complicated anti-quilombo measures.

Amiable Interactions

Despite colonial policies and intentions, the similarity in
the occupations and status of Africans and Indians created opportunities for interaction and cooperation, both within the context of the colonial regime and outside or in opposition to it as well. The period from roughly 1550-1600 witnessed the transition from a plantation labor force that was composed primarily of Indians to one in which Africans came to predominate. Their coexistence on the sugar estates led inevitably to a variety of contacts. When the sugar estate Engenho São Pantaleão do Monteiro near Olinda was sold in 1577 it had 15 Guinea slaves and 25 negros da terra or Indians. 37 At Engenho Santana in Ilhéus in 1572, for example, there were nine Guinea slaves, one of whom was married to a Tapuya woman. Such unions, however, appear to have been relatively rare. The baptismal register from Engenho Sergipe in the Bahian Recôncavo from 1598-1609 listed 176 baptisms of children, but of these, only three or four were the children of mixed African and Indian couples. But opportunities for such unions did exist. At Engenho Sergipe, Domingos Valente, a skilled sugar master married Luiza, who was described as "negra do gentio da terra," and by 1591 the couple had two children. Marcos, a Guinea slave who served as a cowherd married an Indian woman named Marta. But these cases were relatively rare. Indians at Engenho Sergipe kept to themselves and lived together in a Tupi style long house rather than in the senzala or typical slave quarters. It appears that the vast majority of Indians married or had sexual relationships with other Indians, remaining, for the most part, separated from the others in their immediate world. Still, there were pressures for these contacts to develop. The shortage of
African women in the slave trade was a contributing influence forcing African men to seek out and sometimes to marry Indian or mixed race women. Although evidence is sparse, in the interior backlands or sertão where slaveholdings were smaller and where there was often the use of both Indian and African workers, unions between them seem to have been more common.\textsuperscript{38}

Along with the relationships born out of their similar function as laborers, Indians and Afro-Brazilians also developed relations born out of their common military employment. On various occasions both Blacks and Indians were mobilized to meet the attacks of foreign interlopers and unsubdued indigenous peoples. During the Dutch occupation of Northeastern Brazil (1630-54) both the Portuguese and the Dutch employed indigenous and Black soldiers both slave and free in the fighting. On the Dutch side, a captain, named Antonio Mendes, led a combined troop of Tupi Indians, mulattos, and Blacks.\textsuperscript{39} At one point, the famous Luso-Brazilian Black regiment of Henrique Dias was composed of 200 Blacks and 1200 Indians.\textsuperscript{40} Such service might have an international dimension as well. Plans for the reconquest of Angola from the Dutch included the use of Paulistas and their Indian "servos de armas (armed dependents), and eventually Brazilian Indians were used in the reconquest of Angola fighting along side Luso-African forces.\textsuperscript{41}

It was not within the colonial regime, however, but in opposition to it that the best evidence of Afro-Indian contact and cooperation is most apparent. Slave runaways were sometimes integrated into Native American ethnic and kinship networks. At
first, the runaways were enslaved Indians. The Jesuit Father Nóbrega reported in 1559 from Bahia that the nations on the Paraguaçu River and on Itaparica island were taking in fugitives from the Bahian sugar estates and refusing to return them. As Black slavery expanded, however, Afro-Brazilian escapees also arrived in indigenous villages. Sugar planter João Fernandes Vieira as Governor of Paraíba forced the return of sixty Blacks who had been incorporated into the Tapuyas of the powerful chieftain Janduí by holding his son hostage until their return. The specter of collaboration between Indians and enslaved Africans against the colonial regime always generated profound feelings of anxiety and fear. The government occasionally took measures against the possibility. After the savage guerra dos bárbaros, a series of campaigns against the Cariri in Rio Grande do Norte, a formal treaty was concluded in 1695 which included provisions which obligated the Cariri to give military assistance against Indians who opposed Portuguese rule and to capture runaway slaves and return them to their masters. In 1703, Governor General Cristóvão da Costa Freire received a royal order that Blacks, mamelucos, and slaves be prohibited from going into the sertão where they might join with Indians who were in revolt. Evidence of this collaboration given its nature is scarce, but on occasion the colonial regime and its institutions recorded these links. One such case was in the millenarian Santidade movement that erupted in the region of southern Bahia in the 1560s and lasted well into the Seventeenth century. This was a syncretic cult combining Tupi concepts of an earthly paradise or "land
without evil" with aspects of Roman Catholicism. A number of the Indians involved in the religion had apparently been under Jesuit tutelage while others had been enslaved on the sugar plantations. Followers of the cult worshiped certain idols in ceremonies involving alcoholic drinks and tobacco and much of the ideology of the participants was directed against the Portuguese and the colonial regime. The region of Jaguaripe, south of the Paraguaçu River in Bahia became a center of the Santidade and of continuing resistance to the Portuguese. By the 1580s, African and crioulo or Brazilian-born Blacks were also involved in the movement, and the threat they presented together was real enough for it to be mentioned in the royal instructions prepared for a new governor in 1588. By 1610, Governor Diogo de Meneses reported with concern that there were over 20,000 Indians and escaped slaves in the Santidade villages in Jaguaripe, and while as an advocate of the enslavement of Indians he may have inflated the figures, there is no doubt that the movement continued. The threat was not only that of a heretical religion, but the harm that these raiders had caused to the sugar economy by their attacks on engenhos and the disruption of the supplies of firewood from the Jaguaripe region. There was even a fear that some of the escaped slaves living with the Santidade groups were acculturated and savy and might seek cooperation with European interlopers as maroons had done in the Caribbean. The raids and colonial responses to them continued well into the 1620s.

We know something of the internal aspects of the movement because in the 1590s a visit of the Inquisition took place in
Brazil and over 100 people were denounced to the Inquisitors because of their attachment to or contact with the Santidade cult. While the practice of referring to Indian slaves as "negros" complicates the problem of identifying the origins of the participants, a number of the Inquisition trial records enable us to derive some idea of its composition. Alvaro Rodrigues, a *mameluco* sugar planter who led an expedition into the interior against Santidade groups reported that among their followers were many Christian Indians, *mamelucos*, and baptized Africans. The santidade cult of Jaguaripe did present the threat of anti-colonial collaboration on the part of Indians and blacks but the extent of the collaboration remains unknown. Only four of the 104 people accused of santidade participation by the Inquisition were Afro-Brazilians, although testimony and government reports seem to indicate a much greater degree of collaboration. Nevertheless, the pattern of cooperation and the danger it implied to the colonial regime was a matter of real concern.47

Another well-known locale of Afro-Indian cooperation was in the great maroon state of Palmares. Located in southern Pernambuco, this group of politically integrated fugitive communities flourished throughout the seventeenth century. The size of Palmares was estimated by some contemporaries to be over 30,000 inhabitants which may be an exaggeration, but there is no exaggeration in its ability to defeat punitive expeditions sent out by both the Dutch who sought to suppress the maroons during their occupation of Northeast Brazil (1630-54) and the Portuguese who finally did defeat the rebels in 1695 after a long series of
expeditions.

Accounts of the expeditions against Palmares reveal both the use of Indians as military auxiliaries and the presence of Indians within the fugitive communities. Roelof Baro in 1644 led an expedition against the largest Palmares quilombo but had to desist when the tapuyas under his command revolted. Nevertheless, he returned to Recife announcing that he had taken some 37 prisoners among which were seven Indians and a number of "mulatto children." These latter may have been the offspring of Indian-African unions. In 1645, Jan Baer led a larger force which battered the main quilombo and took a number of Indians prisoner among the recaptured slaves. While the African cultural elements of Palmares have usually been emphasized, it is important to note that contemporary observers always noted the presence of Indians within the rebel settlements. Moreover, recent archaeological excavations in Palmares' sites has revealed indigenous pottery remains indicating either the residence of Tupian women or at least trade networks between the maroons and local indigenous groups.

Miscegenation and Cultural Exchange

As the prisoners taken by Baro at Palmares in 1644 revealed, the contact between Africans and Indians as runaways were integrated into indigenous villages or as Indians were captured by or joined maroon communities eventually produced a population of mixed parentage. This process of Afro-Indian miscegenation had, of course, also taken place within the colonial regime and was especially a characteristic of regions like the sertão of
northeastern Brazil in the captaincies of Pernambuco, Rio Grande, and Ceará where a work force composed of both groups was common. In opposition to or beyond the colonial frontiers, however, we can speculate that these unions had a different valence and the place in society of the offspring of these contacts probably varied considerably from their usually depreciated position in colonial society.

In colonial Brazil miscegenation was always a matter of concern. At first, that concern was directed to the children of European-Indian sexual unions. Attitudes toward the offspring of such mixed unions had developed negatively within a generation or so of European arrival. While the first *mamelucos* or *mestizos* were considered "the children of Christians," those that lived according to Indian ways were considered lost souls, and over time their social position fell as the European population grew and the indigenous populations declined, making their role as mediators less important. Even more importantly, with the arrival of large numbers of Africans and the growth of a mulatto population, the status of all persons of mixed origin declined because of the stigma attached to Africans due to either their association with slave status or to racialist ideas. All the intermediate categories tended to become lumped together as *pardos*. In the southern captaincy of São Paulo, for example, the large population of Indians and *mamelucos* or *bastardos* was simply defined out of existence by 18th century censuses which increasingly labeled such people as *pardos*.

Persons of mixed origin were always considered troublesome by
colonial authorities. In 1590, the royal inspector Abreu e Brito on suggestions from informants in Pernambuco suggested that if five hundred Brazilian mamelucos were sent to fight in Angola, it would produce the double benefit of freeing Brazil of an evil influence and helping in the conquest of Africa, because these men knew how "suffer the labors of war, having been raised in them."\textsuperscript{52} Father Techo a Spanish Jesuit who complained of the depredations of slave raiders from São Paulo, many of whom were mamelucos against the Jesuit missionary towns [reducciones] saw the half-breeds as the Devil's helpers: "Satan, angry at seeing the progress of his enemies, united his forces, and then by himself or by the mamelucos, his allies in evil, he sought to destroy the nascent mission towns."\textsuperscript{53}

As miscegenation continued in Brazil producing ever more gradations of racial background, social categories multiplied while the attitudes of the colonial elites tended to lump all the mixed population together. The negative attitudes expressed toward European-Indian children were even more intense in regard toward Afro-Indian offspring in colonial society. It is difficult to find any positive comments about them at all. Regions where such people were numerous became known as particularly dangerous. The captain major of Sergipe de el-Rey wrote in 1751 complaining of the "innumerable" slave fugitives that made life unsafe and he called for companies of Blacks or mulattos to be used for this purpose and to control the Indians and "caboucos." The sertão in general became linked in the administrative mind with violence and as a place of crime because it was the home of marginal or suspect
groups. In 1797, the Ouvidor of Jacobina reported that in the last decade there had been 178 murders in his district, mostly carried out by the "four infamous nations of Blacks, cabras, mestiços, and Tapuyos." Cabra was in this case, the local designation for Afro-Indian mestizos.

Over time, the permutations of sexual contact began to produce a complexity of racial terms and of regional variations in these designations. An Eighteenth century description from Minas Gerais reported that Carijós, a term used originally as a designation for Guaraní-speakers from southern Brazil, had become a label for mestizos or for the child of an Indian and a black woman. It also made a linguistic distinction between caboclos, "those who live on the coast and speak Lingua geral [Tupi]," and tapuyos who did not speak that tongue. Curibocas were described as the offspring of a mulatto and a Black or of a mameluco and Black, which in the sertão were called "salta atraz," or step backward. This terminology seems to be chronologically and regionally specific, caboclos in the northeast often meaning mestiços while in Grão Pará referring to domesticated Indians; curibocas or caborés in Mato Grosso meaning the children of Black-Indian unions.

Whatever the pejorative characterization of Afro-Indian mixture, there was little that colonial society could do to prevent the continued contacts that such people implied. We have an excellent example of how this reality imposed itself on colonial policy and how the dynamic of Indian-Black relations worked in the diary of an anti-quilombo expedition which set out
from Vila Bela, Mato Grosso in 1795. In response to the formation of maroon communities on the Guaporé and São José (formerly the Piolho) Rivers, the local government and the governor organized a small expedition which found the quilombo some thirty-three leagues from Vila Bela. The majority of the residents, however, were Indians and caborés that had been born in the quilombo. The commander explained in his diary that a quilombo had been destroyed in the region some twenty-five years before but that the Blacks that had escaped that attack had reformed their community. They had been constantly at war with the Cabixes Indians and had raided them for women which explained the caborés in the quilombo. The community was in a beautiful location, surrounded by fields of manioc, peanuts, corn, beans, tobacco, fruits, and cotton. The river was full of fish, the hunting was good, and they made their own rough cloth for clothing. The commander listed the captured inhabitants of this Quilombo do Piolho; 8 Indian men, 19 Indian women, 22 caborés, and 6 Blacks, who served as the ruler, doctor, and familial leaders of the community. All were returned to Vila Bela where they were easily baptized since most had some exposure to Catholic doctrine acquired from the fugitive Blacks and since all had learned to speak Portuguese from them as well. The 54 captives were then transported to a new settlement to be called Nova Aldea de Carlota where they offered, and it was hoped, that they could serve as an example and a control of nearby Indian peoples and perhaps attract them to commerce with the Portuguese or to bring in alluvial gold deposits.56

The glimpse we are offered in this account of the Quilombo do
Piolho is a fleeting one. Were its inhabitants really a neoteric Indian group, or were they the Lusified descendants and remnants of African and Afro-Brazilian fugitives? What was the dynamic of this quilombo's social organization and what were the principles of its political structure and rule? Similar questions could be raised about all of the Afro-Indian communities on the margins of colonial society. While we have enough fragmentary comments to know how colonial society viewed and manipulated the contacts between Blacks and Indians, we have little evidence of how Blacks and Indians saw each other and incorporated each other in their social and cultural practices. Within the colonial regime we have some evidence. Unlike colonial Peru and the US South among the Cherokee, Brazilian Indians did not usually own Black slaves, at least within the framework of the colonial regime. In 1806, an observer noted the irrationality of Indians in their rejection of the logic of Western society. He stated: "the natural character of the Indians eludes all philosophy; they have no ambition, they do not value property, and of the most precious property of Brazil, slaves, there is no memory that an Indian has owned one."57

Beyond the frontiers of colonial society in Native American villages and Afro-Brazilian quilombos a number of models operated for the incorporation of outsiders. One was through the structures of kinship in which a number of Native American societies like the Guarani used to incorporate outsiders. Such kinship ties were used to incorporate Whites, other Indians, and probably Blacks as well. Another was through captive adoption,
often of women or children. Dependent or servile statuses existed among a number of indigenous peoples and may have served as a means for bringing outsiders like fugitive Black slaves into their communal life. Yet another response to the problem of incorporation was through the structures of myth, seeking to place difficult to explain "outsiders" in a network of myth beyond time. Mythopoeic responses often inverted or appropriated "powers" held by outsiders and sometimes, as among Western Amazonian peoples in the Sixteenth Century and perhaps among the Santidade followers, produced shaman- led movements that seemed millenarian in content. All of these techniques of integration may have been used as well by Afro-Brazilian communities seeking to incorporate Indians as allies, dependents or slaves, and as members.58

The contact and cooperation between Africans and Native Americans created sentiments and attitudes that can only be partially recovered in their political manifestations of cooperation in resistance to the colonial regime. Other processes such as syncretism were at work. One area of Afro-Indian syncreticism was religion.59 In a number of Afro-Brazilian religions, spread from Amazonas and Maranhao to Pernambuco, Bahia, and Rio de Janeiro, the spirit of the Indian or Caboclo has joined traditional West African dieties. Even within the more conservative Yoruba centered candomblés of Bahia, the figure of the "caboclo" appears along with the traditional African dieties or orixás.60 In the more syncretic Afro-Brazilian cults of umbanda, a major cult figure is that of the Caboclo, who is represented as an Indian and who symbolizes freedom, the hunt, and
defense of the terreiro, the site of worship. There is a possibility that the integration of the figure of an Indian spirit into Afro-Brazilian religion and the creation of the candomblé de caboclo is really an Afro-Brazilian adaptation of the Indian as a national Brazilian symbol in the Romantic era of the Independence period of the 1820s and 1830s rather than an outgrowth of their colonial contacts. Be that as it may, present believers have integrated the Yoruba gods with the "spirits that were the original owners of the land we live in." 61

This integration can also be seen in the self definition of various populations in Brazil. Interviews conducted in the late 1980s with Afro-Brazilians in the coastal communities north of Salvador including the suburb of Itapoã, site of an old whaling station and locale of the first Hausa rebellion of 1814 with which this article began, reveal popular dances and festival presentations in which Indians played a central role. Moreover, oral traditions emphasize the existence of Indians in family lineages and celebrate their presence in them.62 We must be careful with such memories. Being "Indian" is sometimes a way of not being Black, and in the Nineteenth Century during the struggle for independence and the subsequent formation of the nation, people of African descent like all Brazilians came to see the Indian as a symbol of independent Brazil and of freedom itself. But for both Afro-Brazilians and indigenous peoples in Brazil their relationship was far more complex and contested historically than such symbols have the power to convey.
ABREVIATIONS

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>AGS</td>
<td>Archivo General de Simancas (Simancas, Spain)</td>
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<td>AHU</td>
<td>Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino (Lisbon)</td>
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<td>ANTT</td>
<td>Arquivo nacional da Torre do Tombo (Lisbon)</td>
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<td>APB</td>
<td>Arquivo Público do Estado da Bahia (Salvador)</td>
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<td>BI</td>
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<td>IHGB</td>
<td>Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro (Rio de Janeiro)</td>
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Published Works

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>ACMS</td>
<td>Atas da Câmara Municipal do Salvador, Documentos históricos do Arquivo Municipal 10 vols. to date (Salvador, 1944- ).</td>
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<tr>
<td>AHR</td>
<td>American Historical Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHNPA</td>
<td>Cambridge History of the Native Peoples of the Americas, 3 vols. in 6 parts (Cambridge, 1998-</td>
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NOTES

1. Details of the plot are provided in Stuart B. Schwartz, "Cantos e quilombos numa conspiração de escravos haussás, Bahia, 1814," in João José Reis and Flávio Santos Gomes, eds. Liberdade por um fio (São Paulo, 1996), 373-406.


3. Directorio que se deve observar nas povoações dos índios do Pará e Maranhão (Lisbon, 1758), cap. 10. See Rita Heloísa de Almeida, O Diretório dos índios (Brasília, 1997).


5. Petition of the Provincial and Religious of the Company of
Jesus of Brazil (1601?), AGS, Sec. prov. 1461, 104ff.


7. AGS, SP 1487 (7 October 1603), fl. 33-33v.


10. Leite, HCJB, V, 265.

11. Gov. Diogo de Meneses to crown (1 September 1610), ANTT, Fragment caixa 1, n. 6.


14. "Información que hizo por mandado de VMg. sobre unos capítulos que Duarte Gomez de Silveira, vezino de Parahiba, embió a la Mesa de Consciencia," AGS, Sec. prov. libro 1583, fs. 382-89.


17. Ernesto Ennes, Os Palmares (Lisboa, 1938), 41-43.

18. See Frei Vicente do Salvador, História do Brasil, p.346. The Câmara of Ilheús wrote in 1601 to the Count of Linhares, owner of the Engenho Santana in Ilheús, that his sugar estate was one of the best on the Brazilian coast and that to protect it, some gentio who lived near the Count's other estate in the Bahian Recôncavo had been moved to guard the property in Ilheús. See ANTT, Cartório dos Jesuítas, maço 8, n.108 (30 July 1601).

19. BI, King to Gaspar de Sousa (17 August 1612).

20. See Obidos to Capitão do campo, Simão Fernandes Madeira (27 August 1664), DH, VII (1929), 185-186; Obidos, portaria, (6 June, 1667), DH, VII (1929), 301-02; Order given to capitão do campo, Gaspar da Cunha (20 December 1668), DH, XI (1928), 385-86.

21. AHU, Mato Grosso caixa 1 (22 August 1744).
22. Os palmares (Subsidios para a sua história), Ernesto Ennes, ed. (Lisbon, 1958), 113-138.

23. ACMS, I, 327-30

24. Rubellio Dias' report states that the Governor, chief justice (ouvidor geral), treasurer (provedor), bishop and two magistrates (desembargadores) of the mocambo were captured. He also speaks of battling against three "companies" of rebels. It is difficult to discern if this terminology indicates a highly organized social, political, and military organization in the mocambo or was simply a series of equivalencies and references in Dias' mind. See his letter in ACMS, I, 329-332.


26. This incident has been made famous by the treaty proposed by the fugitives in which they specified the conditions under which they would return to the Engenho Santana. The information presented here comes from a newly published letter by Francisco Nunes da Costa, Ouvidor of Ilheus (12 June 1789), in Cartas baianas setecentistas, Tania Lobo, ed. (Sao Paulo, 2001), p.63. See also, Stuart B. Schwartz, "Resistance and Accomodation in Eighteenth Century Brazil. The Slaves' View of Slavery," Hispanic American Historical Review, 57:1 (1979), 69-81.

27. The story of this expedition is reported in João José Reis, "Escravos e coiteiros no quilombo de Oitizeiro, Bahia, 1806," in João José Reis and Flávio dos Santos Gomes, Liberdade por um fio (São Paulo, 1996), 332-372. See also APB, "Traslado a Devassa," caixa 287.


32. ANTT, Manuscritos do Brasil, 11, f.7.


39. José Antônio Gonsalves de Mello, *Tempo dos Flamengos*, 2nd ed. (Recife, 1978), p. 195. When the Dutch surrendered in 1654, Mendes' men were spared but were denied the honor of leaving in possession of their arms.

40. Antonio Vieira to merchants of Brazil (Sept. 12, 1646) in John Nieuhof, *Memorável viagem martítima e terrestre ao Brasil* (1682) (São Paulo, 1981), p. 299. A number of major engagements in the Luso-Dutch War in Brazil (1645-54) were fought by large contingents of indigenous troops under European direction. In Rio Grande, for example, a force of 500 Dutch and 800 Tapuya and Pitiguar were routed by the Indian archers of Felipe Camarão. See Manuel Calado, *O Valeroso Lucideno*, 2 vols. (Belo Horizonte, 1987), II, pp. 165-73. See also, José Antônio Gonsalves de Mello, *Henrique Dias, Governador dos crioulos, negros e mulatos do Brasil* (Recife, 1988).


44. "Retificação de paz feita com os tapuias janduins da Ribeira do Açu, (Sept. 20, 1995), AHU, Rio Grande, pap. avul. caixa 1, 40. This treaty and a similar one of 1697 made with the Tapuias Arius pequenas that includes the same provisions appears as an appendix in Pedro Puntoni, "A guerra dos bárbaros. Povos indígenas e a colonização do sertão do nordeste do Brasil, 1650-1720," Ph.d. thesis, Universidade de São Paulo, 1988).

45. *Carta régia* (Lisbon, 6 June 1706), IHGB, Arq. 1.2.25 from Conselho Ultramarino, VI, 103.


47. Vainfas, *A heresia dos índios* (São Paulo, 1995),


and F. dos Santos Guerra, eds. (São Paulo, 1996), 26-51; C.E. Orser, Jr. In Search of
Zumbi. The 1993 Season (Normal, Ill., 1993); For a review of research on Palmares see
Robert Nelson Anderson, "The Quilombo of Palmares: A New Overview of a Maroon State in
545-566.

50. I have written on this theme in "Brazilian Ethnogenesis: mestizos, mame lucos, and
pardos," in Le Nouveau Monde, Mondes Nouveaux S. Gruzinski and N. Wachtel, eds.
(Paris, 1996), pp. 7-28

51. See Muriel Nazarri, "Vanishing Indians: The Social Construction of Race in Colonial

52. Domingos de Abreu e Brito, Um inquerito a vida administrativa e economica de Angola
e do Brasil (1591), Alfredo de Albuquerque Felner, ed. (Coimbra, 1931), p. 9

53. Nicholas del Techo, Historia de la Provincia del Paraguay de la Compania de Jesus,
5 vols. (Madrid, 1897), I, p. 4.

54. Captitao-Mor of Sergipe de El-rey to Crown (16 Sept. 1751), APB, Ord. reg. 76, 178-
181; Ignacio Accioli de Cerqueira e Silva, Memorias historicas e politicas da
provincia da Bahia, 6 vols. (Bahia, 1925), III, pp. 222-223.

55. ANTT, Manuscritos do Brasil, n.43, f.710-711v.

56. Diario of Francisco Pedro de Mello (Vila Bela, 28 July 1795), in IHGB, Arq. 1.2.5
"Correspondencia do governador de Matto Grosso,, 1777-1805," f. 165-177v. It should be
noted that the same expedition also raided two other small quilombos where all the
inhabitants were escaped slaves. The eighteen people apprehended were returned to their
masters, the quilombos and their crops were destroyed, and "the repeated flights of the
slaves of this town and its outliers [arrayaes] suspended."

57. AHU, Rio Grande do Norte, pap. avul. caixa 6 (3 Sept. 1806). I have cited this
statement previously in Stuart B. Schwartz, "The Formation of a Colonial Identity in
Brazil," in Colonial Identity in the Atlantic World, 1500-1800, N. Canny and A. Pagden,

58. The methods of integration are discussed with examples in Stuart B. Schwartz and

59. In this area the French anthropologist, Roger Bastide was a pioneer in his Les
Ameriques noires (1967) translated as, African Civilizations in the New World (New
York, 1971), pp- 72-88. This chapter "The Meeting of the Negro and Indian," is one of
the earliest and still most suggestive essays on the topic of Black-Indian contacts in
the Americas.

60. Jocelio Teles dos Santos, O dono da terra. O caboclo nos candomles da Bahia
(Salvador, 1995).

61. Frances O'Gorman, Aluanda. A Look at Afro-Brazilian Cults (Rio de Janeiro, 1977),
72-74; Tania Almeida Gandon, "O indio e o negro:uma relacao legendaria, Afro-Asia, 19-
20 (1997), pp. 135-164. On the symbol of the Indian or caboclo which emerged in the
1820s in the popular commemorations of independence, see Hendrik Kraay, "Entre o Brasil e Bahia: as comemrações do Dois de Julho em Salvador no século xix," Afro-Asia, 23 (2000), 49-88.