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## Collective Degradation: Slavery and the Construction of Race

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*Slavery Without Racism, Racism Without Slavery: Mainland North  
America and Elsewhere*

By Stanley L. Engerman, University of Rochester\*

### I

Slavery is often regarded as the most extreme form of dependency, exploitation, and domination, in which individuals can be bought and sold, and are legally subject to complete control in decisions of where to live and to work. It is the most clear-cut form of domination, dependent on the controls of the state or a cartel of the elite, and thus probably the easiest type of coerced arrangement to end legally.

Slavery has been an exceptionally pervasive institution, until very recently existing in almost all societies in the past as well as in almost all parts of the world.<sup>1</sup> Few groups did not enslave others, and few were not themselves at some time enslaved. Slavery clearly existed prior to the emergence of scientific racism and the enslaved were not always peoples of different color.<sup>2</sup> Perceptions of racial and color

differences have also long existed, but without necessarily leading to enslavement or other extreme forms of differential treatment of those of a different race.<sup>3</sup> The linking of race and slavery, with race as the defining characteristic of the enslaved, came mainly with the settlement of the Americas and the transatlantic slave trade from Africa. Even then, however, slavery in other parts of the world persisted without a racial (as usually defined) underpinning. Indeed the debate continues on whether racism caused slavery (as argued about for about colonial America) or whether slavery gave rise to a coherent racism, to justify enslavement of others (as argued by, for example, Eric Williams).<sup>4</sup> Racism may be used to justify the harsh treatment of others, or it may reflect mainly a belief that some differences among groups exist and race provides the interpretation of why such differences did exist. Presumably then, awareness of perceived or argued for racial differences could exist without the imposition of differential treatments, possibly but not frequently, given the role racial beliefs play in social organization.

While it generally appears that groups enslave others only when they can consider them to be different – outsiders – precisely who can be seen as outsiders, and what permits enslavement rather than some seemingly lesser forms of degradation, is not clear.<sup>5</sup> Outsiders are customarily a created category, useful to exclude some people from the rights of membership in a society. In the past those considered outsiders have included those of different religion, ethnicity, nationality, class, and other characteristics.<sup>6</sup> It is sometimes based on what some regard as “objective” criteria, sometimes clearly artificially created. Over time, among western powers, the outsider to be enslaved became limited to those regarded of being a different race, although in the past not all enslaved were of a different race (as usually defined), as in Africa, Asia, Western Europe

before 1300, and among Native Americans, nor were all of a different race enslaved, as contrasted with other forms of differential treatment. Even while racial distinctions may have become the basis of different treatments, distinctions based on color did not always lead to the extreme case of enslavement. Argued for racial differences, were, however, amplified and exaggerated over time in some areas with the expansion of slavery.

## II

There are several different forms of treatment of outsiders, each with historical examples, which means that the relation between race and slavery is not the only, inevitable outcome. How these choices varied with economic, social, political, and cultural conditions raises many important questions. There the several possible outcomes of a belief in racial differences, characterizing different societies or else the same society at different times:

1. Enslavement – at least of some of the outsiders, with controls over work, life, and location, as well as the ability to exploit the labor of the slave.
2. Exclusion – as frequently seen in immigration policies and as in the racist antislavery arguments, either based on desires for a homogeneous society to be achieved by keeping away outsiders, or else to limit numbers in the interest of the security of the insiders. This might be to prevent slaves who might rebel from being brought in, the fear of workers who might fight for wartime foes in times of conflict (as in arguments for English restrictions against alien

immigration in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries), or else, a desire to maintain employment for residents.<sup>7</sup>

3. Separation – to move groups, already present, as with Native Americans in the U.S. or Canada and aborigines in Australia, to self-contained areas distant from places of majority group settlement. This was often argued to allow them better education and training, but it also meant greater employment in the interests of the majority population, and lessened contact of the majority group with these outsiders.
4. Imposition of forms of maltreatment and discrimination short of slavery – leaving peoples in a lessened social and political condition, via legal or non-legal forms of coercion.
5. Assimilation and/or conversion – as reflected in the concepts of the Melting Pot for American immigrants or integration for blacks, or else to permit captives and/or slaves to enter into lineages and kin groups, as in Africa, whether expected to be immediate or with some delay.
6. Extinction or extermination- deliberate attempts to eliminate some or all of the others, to provide room and lower control costs for the insiders.
7. Killing of individuals – as in the human sacrifice of war captives, as practiced by Aztecs, Incas, Vikings, and (until about 1870) Indians on the Northwest Coast of mainland North America.<sup>8</sup>
8. Deportation or Return to Place of Prior Residence – this was an aspect of the antebellum colonization movement and of later encouragement for a “Back to Africa” movement. Some recipients of indentured labor in the late nineteenth

century provided for a subsidized return, either immediately after the indenture period or several years later.

Patterns of adaptation to racial and other differences vary dramatically over time, even within the same society. Australia has had different patterns of behavior for different groups. After arrival of the British, aborigines were pushed aside, some might say with attempts to be driven to extinction, and given limited (or no) rights to vote (until 1962), to own land, or to receive the same education as British citizens until almost two centuries later.<sup>9</sup> Even today aborigines are among the relatively low income and less educated of minority groups in the former British settlements. British convicts were initially the dominant settler group, but even after three decades the emancipists (time – expired convicts) still had only limited legal and political rights.<sup>10</sup> In the late 1860's Australians in Queensland sought to produce cane sugar, rather than import it, and to do so began to import Kanaka laborers from the Pacific Islands under indenture contracts to work on the plantations.<sup>11</sup> At about this time Australian firms in the new British protectorate of Fiji began sugar production with contract labor from the Pacific Islands and from India (the later leading to continuing political problems with the resident Fijians that remain divisive even today).<sup>12</sup> By the 1890's Australians decided they wanted to have a more homogeneous white society, and, therefore, to prevent immigration of Chinese, Indian, and Japanese, as well the Pacific Islanders.<sup>13</sup> Since the Australians still wanted to produce their own sugar, even without indentured gang labor, they then decided to exclude all but white settlers (allowing or even encouraging southern Europeans, including Italians, to enter), and they provided a system of bounties and

tariffs to permit small-scale production of sugar. The Parliamentary debate in Australia showed some awareness that this shift in the means of producing sugar could lead to higher priced sugar, but it was felt to be acceptable in order to achieve their social goals.<sup>14</sup> And white Australia did persist until the 1970's, when its reversal was due to some combination of moral and economic factors, including the British willingness to shift concerns to Europe and away from the Commonwealth, and the perceived need for more commercial contacts between Australia and Asia.

In trying to examine the moral basis of antislavery, the Western European case raises interesting questions. Slavery of other Europeans persisted in Western Europe to about 1300.<sup>15</sup> The slave trade among white Europeans, from the northwest to the southeast, had been high from the fifth to the eleventh or twelfth centuries.<sup>16</sup> The restriction of slavery among Europeans did not, however, lead to a more peaceful environment. While slavery was apparently precluded, nothing was done to limit war, murder, torture, rape, or pillage, on economic or religious grounds between, or within, countries. Slavery of Africans began in southern Europe in the fifteenth century (a time when the link of race and slavery was being given more attention with the influx of slaves from sub-Saharan Africa to Islamic areas as well as southern Europe).<sup>17</sup> Yet even with slavery for Africans within Europe, there was no slavery of western Europeans in Europe although the Barbary pirates did enslave Europeans after the seventeenth century.<sup>18</sup> In this period there were, however, large numbers of Europeans killed in wars and war-related plagues and famines. Germany's population decline in the Thirty Years War was estimated to be between 4 and 8 million.<sup>19</sup> From the fifteenth to the nineteenth century at least 13 million Europeans were killed or injured in wars with other Europeans, and the

twentieth century estimates of battle deaths are of about 9 million dead in World War I and 15 million in World War II.<sup>20</sup>

### III

There were many other great disasters in different societies, not race related (as usually defined) but of dramatic harshness. The nature of these disasters, some within a very limited time span, some spread out in time, pose issues concerning what types and magnitudes of events societies can cope with and allow recovery from without suffering severe permanent declines. These include

a) Famines: China (1958-62): 30-40 million<sup>21</sup>

North China (1867-79): 9-13 million<sup>22</sup>

India (1769-70): 3-10 million<sup>23</sup>

Russia (1932-34): 10 million<sup>24</sup>

Ireland (1846-51): 1 million (over one-ninth of the population)<sup>25</sup>

b) Mainly Diseases: Black Death in Europe (1347-51) c. 20-26 million

(about one-quarter to one-third of Europe's population)<sup>26</sup>

Amerindian population (sixteenth Century) c. 40 million (about 80 percent of its precontact population)<sup>27</sup>

Australian Aboriginies (1788-1850): c. 700,000<sup>28</sup>

Worldwide Influenza (1918-19): 25-50 million<sup>29</sup>

c) Internal Uprising: China -Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864): c. 20 million<sup>30</sup>

Russian Purges and Collectivization (1930's): c. 15-25 million<sup>31</sup>

World War II Holocaust (1941-1945): over 6 million<sup>32</sup>

Chinese Civil War (1949-54): over 7.5 million<sup>33</sup>

d) Wars of Conquest: China - Genghis Khan (13<sup>th</sup> Century): 35 million<sup>34</sup>

Manchu Invasion (17<sup>th</sup> Century): 25 million<sup>35</sup>

Congo (1880-1920): 10 million<sup>36</sup>

e) Human Sacrifice: Aztecs (Fifteenth Century) up to 20,000 per year<sup>37</sup>

In addition, there are estimates of other events, such as the numbers killed in Africa in civil wars between 1945 and 2000, of over 14.5 million, and the 1970's deaths in Cambodia (1975-1978) of about 2 million.<sup>38</sup> And, if all mortality differentials among nations and groups within nations were to be attributed to deliberate actions of wealthy nations or individuals limiting food supply, the numbers could basically be limitless.

The Belgian Congo atrocities occurred at a time when Germans were expanding with colonies into Africa and the Pacific, with laws and, more important, behavior with some periodic harshness toward Africans but their beliefs and behaviors seemed more similar to the colonies of other European nations within Africa than to these of the Belgians.<sup>39</sup> Clearly, however, by the middle of the twentieth century, in Europe itself, racism took a rather different turn in Germany than it did in Belgium.

Once may, of course, be skeptical of some of these estimates even though many of these are widely used, and several cases may not have been listed. There is obviously some rough degree of approximation. But, as Adam Smith, the Scotch moral philosopher, remarked about the claim (without a source citation) in David Hume's The History of England "the great earl of Warwick is said to have entertained every day at his



different manors, thirty thousand people; and though the number here may have been exaggerated, it must, however, have been very great to admit of such exaggeration.”<sup>40</sup>

#### **IV Slavery Without Racism**

As noted above, given the late date to which the rise of scientific racism is attributed, it would seem that most cases of past slavery have rested upon other characteristics for the outsiders. White enslavement of white, Asian enslavement of Asian, Amerindian enslavement of Amerindian, African enslavement of African; all have featured prominently in the long history of slavery. Nathan Huggins commented in explaining slavery in Africa and sales of slaves from Africa, that Africans did not yet believe that they were all Africans rather than members of different “tribes”, a point equally true at some times for whites of different nations and classes, as well as of Asians from different areas.<sup>41</sup> There has been some debate as to whether intra-racial slavery might have been less harsh and more flexible than inter-racial slavery, and whether these differences reflected conditions other than the nature of the outputs being produced. The differences between intra-racial and inter-racial slavery may also have influenced the patterns of interpersonal relations between slaves and masters, the psychological impact of enslavement, and the nature of the adjustment process after emancipation.

There were, however, links between inter-racial and intra-racial slavery that did have major impacts, as they could influence choices made by societies regarding the enslavement of different racial groups. The early ending of slavery of Amerindians by settlers in North and South America became pivotal in the expansion there of African

slavery, whether due to economic or cultural factors. The enslavement of Africans by other Africans (of distinct tribes not of different races) may have led to a mild form of control for those who remained in Africa, and did not go into the transatlantic or Islamic slave trades. The willingness, however, to sell Africans into an international slave trade meant that a considerably more difficult regime was faced by those traded and their descendents.<sup>42</sup> The selling of slaves by Africans to Europeans provided larger numbers of laborers to the Americas, and laborers who could be coerced into undesirable forms of labor, unlike the white Europeans who came to the Americas, whether contract laborers or free migrants. Asians might have made useful slaves – they did become important as indentured laborers later, but the distances and costs of movement from Asia were too great in the early settlement years of America. White indentured labor from England was generally the first labor to come to North America in the settlement years, and it awaited both a relative decline in slave prices, due to increased numbers of slave available, improvements in distribution and transport costs, and a decline in other markets for slaves, and a rise in the costs of indentured labor due to improvements in the British economy, before slavery replaced indentured labor, and one form of coerced labor without racism ended.<sup>43</sup>

## **V Racism Without Slavery**

Many societies have recognized racial and ethnic distinctions without slavery, since they can introduce other coercive mechanisms short of slavery. As noted above, racism can lead to a number of different outcomes, not just enslavement, even when slavery was still legal. Exclusion of immigrants has been quite frequent, forcing individuals to stay where they are and to suffer the costs of the higher population and labor force with a probable

loss of income suffered in the area they would otherwise have left. Not only does exclusion of potential immigrants mean the inability of individuals from another nation to gain from better economic opportunities, it also means that worse economic conditions could develop in those nations.<sup>44</sup>

The precise definition of slavery will influence the extent of “racism without slavery,” given the range of coercive measures possible. If slavery is defined as including the buying and selling of individuals who are without legal rights regarding mobility, job choice, and opportunity, then the numbers in the category of racism without slavery will be large. If, however, the definition is expanded to include Apartheid in South Africa, *encomienda* and *mita* for South American Amerindians, various forms of debt bondage, or political restrictions on immigrant voting, then a much broader linking of slavery and racism would be possible, and racism with slavery will be a larger category, even if not that much worse than racism without slavery.

There are also cases where racism might be argued to clearly exist but the society does not have slavery. The ending of legal slavery obviously provides one set of circumstances of racism without slavery, at least contemporary slavery, consistent with exploitation and discrimination. The exclusion of groups may reflect racial attitudes, but this means that slavery would not develop. The 1624 antislavery argument in Swedish Delaware, made by Usselinx, advocated keeping slaves out so as to encourage white immigration and a homogeneous society.<sup>45</sup> More than a century later arguments for the exclusion of slaves were argued for both reasons of social homogeneity as well as the fear that larger numbers would pose a problem of political disorder.<sup>46</sup> Another manner in which racism may persist without slavery concerns the killing of wartime captives, for

military or religious reasons. It was suggested by Edmund Scott in the early seventeenth century, that the aims of European warfare in contrast with Asian and African warfare differed – the former fought to kill, the later to enslave.<sup>47</sup> Slavery, of a somewhat voluntary nature because of very low incomes, existed in parts of Europe, Asia and Africa, at a time in which other parts of Europe avoided slavery by the practices of abandonment and infanticide. While some might argue that being without slavery will always be better than having slavery, to those at the time this may not always be the case, particularly when societies have very low and very variable levels of income.<sup>48</sup>

The nature of racism, and its impact, would differ depending upon the sources of racism and the basis of its enforcement. Government sanctioned, imposed, and enforced racism was frequent and the legal controls meant that the impact of racism was strong. If the racism did not have governmental force, but reflected the cultural and other beliefs of members of the population, there would be some impacts but probably not as severe as if legally enforceable. And, even in the absence of racism, the effective control over slaves will depend upon the whether laws exist and are enforced or if the controls are from a cartel of owners and possible owners. Since many slave societies have legal codes recognizing slavery, the social control over slaves have generally been clearly defined, and frequently enforced.

Several different variants of racism without slavery can be discussed. First, is racism prior to or in the absence of slavery. Second is the simultaneous existence within one nation of slavery and non-slavery, whether due to one area ending slavery prior to another, or one region never having experienced slavery. In the case of the United States it was the former, requiring specific state level legal measures to end slavery in the North

prior to the ending at the national level. Also at issue are the relative differences in attitudes towards those born free or manumitted and those enslaved. Third is the question of the existence of racism after the ending of slavery.

In regard to the first category, the absence of slavery need not mean that there was no impact from racism, since other forms of legislation or social behavior can limit rights of the groups of outsiders, and they can be forced to accept economic and political limitations. Only the absence of racism or various other aspects of otherness would seem to permit a desired equality, the absence of slavery not being a sufficient condition for equality in the population.

In the second case, which includes that of the United States, the northern states ended slavery by the first part of the nineteenth century, generally by not freeing any of the enslaved, but with some specified time of belonging and working for the mother's owner before being free (although they were never considered to be slaves).<sup>49</sup> This compelled labor time provided some compensation to the owner of the slaves's mother. Yet ending slavery, without ending racism, still meant severe limitations on the free blacks in terms of voting rights, rights to education and occupations, and, at times, even the ability to locate in different states. For example, 1813 legislation in Illinois prevented the legal entry of blacks. If they then did not leave, they would be subject to whipping.<sup>50</sup> As of 1838 only 6 of the 27 northern and midwestern states permitted blacks to vote (and one of them had differential property requirements for blacks and for whites).<sup>51</sup> In a few cases where blacks were not able to vote, "civilized Indians" were legally allowed to vote, and between 1863 and 1870 in several northern states and territories it was decided in elections and referenda not to let blacks vote.<sup>52</sup> Of course, such limitations for the

free blacks also existed in the South, where slavery continued, but according to the 1850 Census it is probable that free blacks in the South had a more favorable occupational structure and greater wealth in real estate than did free blacks in the North.<sup>53</sup> In most other New World slave societies where there was free blacks, whether due to free birth, free arrival, or manumission, there remained differences between the rights and economic conditions of the free blacks and those still enslaved, although ending the legal condition of slavery need not have had a dramatic impact upon the social conditions between the races.

The third case, racism after the ending of slavery, poses significant questions in attempting to analytically distinguish the legacy of slavery from the circumstances of the post -emancipation world. The explanation for the ending of slavery and the role, if any, of changes in racism in this ending remains debated. In few cases, at least in the Americas, does it appear that slavery ended because racism had previously disappeared, or even that race and slavery both ended at about the same time. Rather, slavery ended due to reasons having little to do with changing racial beliefs, and racism seemingly persisted and adapted into the post-slavery era. The particular combination of religious, moral and economic arguments that ended slavery is not clear, but arguments have included economic losses, the political conflict with another party to achieve a change in the overriding political power structure in the nation or in the metropolis, fear of slave revolt, concern with the distributional effects on the incomes of the poor, or a willingness to forego coerced labor in the interests of other social ends. Ending slavery may lead to a different form in which racist belief influences society, but not necessarily its disappearance.

There is generally some shifting in the beliefs of some members of society professed at the time of emancipation, however, since the nature of the antislavery argument often introduced a greater belief in the humanity and ability of the ex-slaves. The basic economic and psychological arguments against slavery have had a long history, going back into the ancient world, where the inefficiency of slave labor (typically regarded, then and later, as one-half as productive as free) and the Sambo-esque response to being a slave were commented upon.<sup>54</sup> What is often called the anti-slavery argument in the nineteenth century is less an attack on slavery since the moral, psychological, and economic arguments go back to the ancient world, than it is an attempt to redefine the nature of the outsider who generally is still an outsider, but now possibly less of one than before.

To understand what happened after slavery it is necessary to determine whether it was accompanied by a change in racial attitudes, in either the short or the long run. To those who argue that slavery caused racism, it might seem that ending slavery, for whatever reason, should lead to an end of racism. Yet, as shall be discussed below, this does not seem a frequent case. It is possible to find situations where ending slavery actually exacerbated racism, or at least led to racism taking a different form, and racism was still able to outweigh other forms of differences between groups, than it is to find cases where racist belief was weakened.<sup>55</sup>

## **VI Racism After Slavery**

The nature of racism and its impact upon the population can vary over time, both under slavery and afterward, although the eradication of racial attitudes, in contrast with peoples' attitudes towards differences in nationality, ethnicity, and religion, has not been

a frequent occurrence. Nevertheless the impact of racism and behavior regarding race has varied considerably over time, as will be indicated by examining the experience of the United States since 1865.

Discussions of policies to effectively end slavery have also included debates over the pace at which full emancipation should take place, whether it should be immediate or gradual, and whether there should be a strong or a weak governmental presence. While the appropriate moral action, given the evil of slavery, would seem to be immediate emancipation, presumably with compensation or reparations (something provided no slaves or serfs, at least in modern times), the case for gradual emancipation referred to the need for education to labor and avoid poverty, as well as the need to learn how to avoid disruptive and socially undesirable behavior.<sup>56</sup> The argument for gradual emancipation was not always racist, since it was based on accepting the arguments of the destructive impact of slavery (and serfdom) on the enslaved, and the belief that, therefore, some time was needed before the government could withdraw its control over the process of emancipation. Even before the nineteenth century slave emancipations, writers such as Bodin and Condorcet, who were opposed to slavery, argued for the necessity of gradual emancipation.<sup>57</sup> Condorcet claimed that the slaves would not benefit from “suddenly restoring to them their freedom” since “you would reduce them to poverty”, and that this applied both to “black slavery” and to “feudal slavery.” Similar arguments about the possibly long-term nature of slavery’s destructive impact were also made by early antislavery societies in the U.S., England, and elsewhere.<sup>58</sup> The benefits of gradual emancipation were, in part the financial return it provided to slave owners by extending laboring by coerced labor, and this was one of the reasons for the apprenticeship schemes



introduced by England and several other European powers as part of their emancipation schemes. Designing an appropriate scheme of gradual emancipation was, of course, not easy, particularly as it meant a shift control in the of slaves from their owners under one set of laws to either their owners or the government under a new set of rules and regulations.

With the ending of the Civil War federal legislation permitted blacks to vote, immediately, a right not given to the other new citizens, the immigrants, who needed to wait at least three to five years. The various southern states imposed Black Codes to restrict blacks, but these were soon held to be illegal. While not ignoring or downplaying the violence against blacks and limitations imposed upon their lives, legally and non-legally, the first quarter-century after the ending of slavery had some quite different conditions than did the subsequent half-century. In the period to 1890 blacks were allowed to vote (and their political participation was quite high by world standards). Their literacy and schooling rate rose dramatically and the per pupil expenditures on black schools (from public and private, black and white, sources) were more than one-half those of whites, and southern black literacy rates exceeded those in many other parts of the world. Blacks were able to acquire ownership of about 20 percent of farms they operated, an increase from the base of about zero in 1860, black wealthholding increased rapidly, and, in general, incomes for both blacks and whites were rising.<sup>59</sup> The number of blacks lynched was lower than it would be later, indeed lower than for whites through 1885. Lynching was then to acquire distinct racial connotations in the south, where, from 1880 to 1930 eighty-five percent of those lynched were black.<sup>60</sup> Elsewhere in the nation,

however, where the number lynched was about 20 percent of the southern figure, only 17 percent of those lynched were black.<sup>61</sup>

This apparent, albeit limited, progress, from 1865 to 1890, was dramatically reversed in the 1890's, a decade of decline in the cotton market and limited southern economic growth, and the racial impact of these changes was to persist for about one half-century, through the depression of the 1930's.<sup>62</sup> In this decade blacks lost most of their voting rights, the ratio of black to white educational expenditures per pupil declined sharply, the numbers of blacks lynched increased, southern states introduced discriminatory laws regarding occupations and transportation, and the Supreme Court's decision in *Plessy vs. Ferguson* effectively allowed discrimination in many activities.<sup>63</sup> The principal method used to reduce black voting in the south was the introduction of literacy tests as the basis of qualification to vote. Eight southern states introduce such a measure between 1890 and 1910, although such northern states as Connecticut and Massachusetts had introduced literacy tests in the 1850's.<sup>64</sup> By 1923, 10 northern states, on both the east and west coasts, had literacy tests, the former aimed at European immigrants and the latter at Orientals. All states ended literacy tests at the same time, due to federal legislation. Whether the intensification of racism in the 1890's could be attributed to the southern elite imposing or providing conditions for an expanded set of racist belief and behavior on poorer whites, or whether the poor whites were able to reach these beliefs on their own, in their own self-defined economic and cultural interests, has been debated, but in either event the reversal of economic and social conditions left a strong racial impact.<sup>65</sup>

The next dramatic change in black economic and social conditions occurred in the years of World War I and the 1920's. This was due to a major success of the American labor movement, but one which apparently had some unexpected effects. After years of agitation, the unions, and various other groups, were able to obtain legislation to reduce the total number of immigrants who could enter the country, as well as establish a breakdown by nationalities. Whereas in earlier periods, U.S. business expansions attracted foreigners to come to the United States to work and settle here, thus blocking out-migration from the South, adequate amounts of foreign labor could not come to the United States in World War I and the 1920's. Since there was no legal restriction regarding internal migration, this led large numbers of southern blacks and whites to move northward, as well as to southern cities, to seek higher-paying industrial pursuits. This movement was reversed in the 1930's, and then resumed during and after World War II. Even with the discrimination of northern cities, there were some apparently perceived advantages to leaving the South.

Some of the complexities of analyzing the effects of racism due to changes in behavior if not beliefs can be illustrated by comparisons of the South with other areas. Clearly the per capita income of U.S. blacks exceeded the incomes of blacks in the British Caribbean, as did U.S. levels of schooling. Nevertheless, when both British West Indian and southern blacks first migrated to the northern cities, those from the West Indies (and particularly Barbados) were initially regarded as more successful, economically and politically. One important reason is that while the South was 30-40 percent black, the West Indian islands were over 90 percent black. This meant that many of the middle-class-type jobs were done by blacks in the islands, but not by blacks in the

U.S., given the greater availability of whites.<sup>66</sup> While those whites remaining in the West Indies, often descended from slave owners, maintained strong racial beliefs, the differing impact of the migration from the U.S. South and the British West Indies indicates that the effects of racism can vary based on the population composition. Being a very small part of a population, however, need not limit the introduction of restrictive legislation, as the share of aborigines in the Australian population and of Indians in the U.S and Canadian populations have only been about one-two percent in the last century.

Another comparison concerns the case of Cuba, often considered the most liberal and least racist of the New World ex-slave powers. At a time when the southern states were taking away the black vote, in 1902 Cuba provided Afro-Caribbeans the right to vote, something never taken away. Yet in 1912, in what is generally regarded as a political uprising, about 5,000 black Cubans and only a very few whites were killed.<sup>67</sup> This number of black deaths, concentrated within a short time, exceeds the total number of blacks lynched in the South between 1880 and 1930.

The changing nature of the impact of racism with varying economic forces can also be seen in some of the measured characteristics of the black family that are frequently discussed. Many have linked today's magnitude of single-headed households and illegitimate births to the experiences under slavery and their persisting influences. The same arguments were made about 50 years ago, and even earlier. Yet today's rates of female-headed households and illegitimate births are at least twice as high as they were in 1950. The lasting effects of slavery upon the black family might still be present, but the contemporary causes of the sharp recent changes, with large increases not occurring until more than one hundred years after the end of slavery, does provide a puzzle.<sup>68</sup>

In several economic regards, the post-emancipation response in output levels and production structure in the U.S. resembled that of most other ex-slave societies.<sup>69</sup> Output of all crops declined for a number of years and the plantation sector was curtailed. This despite the hopes of planters to restore the plantation, aided by the introduction of government legislation and private behavior aimed at achieving this end. Despite this use of force and coercion, a return to the plantation sector by the ex-slaves was seldom achieved in any ex-slave society, and only in those with a limited supply of land. Even when it was accomplished, this was mainly with the introduction of imported labor. Trinidad, British Guiana, and Mauritius restored the plantation system with indentured labor from India, China, the Portuguese Islands, and other areas.<sup>70</sup> The introduction of Indians in these areas ultimately led to political conflict with the descendants of African slaves. Cuba and Brazil resumed production of what had been plantation outputs, but on the basis of smaller units with immigrants from Europe, while in the U.S. cotton output expanded with production by whites on small farms, farmers who had previously been unable to compete with plantations. Despite the abolitionists claim that small farms would be more productive than plantations, this was doubtful. Even with declines in output, however, there was probably a changing distribution of earnings favorable to ex-slaves. Only Barbados was able to maintain a plantation system using ex-slave labor, but its large population relative to the land available led to out-migration after the middle of the nineteenth century. With the exceptions of Barbados and of the U.S., where ex-slaves often produced cotton on small farms, most ex-slaves left the plantation-crop sector, and some moved either into self-sufficient agricultural production or else production for

sales in local markets. Most ex-slaves remained in rural areas, and probably had less direct contact with white society than they had had under slavery.

The most extreme case of the disappearance of the plantation was in Haiti, once probably the richest area in the world on the basis of sugar and coffee production.<sup>71</sup> The economic and political problems faced by Haiti were exacerbated by the racism and general antagonism of European and American whites, but attempts to legally create a new plantation sector failed, and in the twentieth-century Haitian labor migrated to produce sugar in Cuba and the Dominican Republic. Haiti's first constitution explicitly prohibited whites from voting and owning property, and since then very few whites have settled there<sup>72</sup>. Thus, while on a day-to-day basis, Haitians do not confront racism of a type seen elsewhere the long-term impact of external racism has remained.

## **VII Some Other Issues**

Even were the beliefs of white racism regarding blacks and black slaves of a similar nature in different areas, the demographics of settlement might lead to rather different patterns of black-white interaction and black culture and society. Based on patterns of climate and production, societies will have different ratios of black to white, different sizes of the units on which slaves worked with different black-white ratios, different densities of population, and differences in the ratios of newly-arrived slaves to the total slave population, both before and after the ending of the transatlantic slave trade. The latter will be influenced by the period of time that the slave trade remained legally open, and the extent of illegal smuggling. While the Iberian (Catholic) variant of slavery is often considered to be less harsh than that of the northwest European (Protestant), and the Spanish and Portuguese colonies did have a greater frequency of manumissions, the

Spanish and Portuguese colonies, when they produced crops on plantation systems did not appear milder in treatment of slaves and they were the last in the New World to end the slave trade and then slavery.<sup>73</sup>

These factors will have influenced the slaves' cultural patterns as well as the nature of master-slave interaction. Distinctions by plantation size and rural – urban location also provide for significant differences in master-slave behavior towards each other. For example, slavery as experienced by Fredrick Douglass, gave him occupational and residential choices.<sup>74</sup> Douglass was unusual, not in his right to self-hire, but in his attempt and ability to escape. The wide range of interactions detailed in slave narratives, planter letter and record books, and in works like the diary of Thomas Thistlewood, suggest the difficulty of any generalization on psychological and cultural questions.<sup>75</sup> The extent to which slaves had agency was, legally and otherwise, at master sufferance and approval, although not to allow the slaves at least some of the space they wanted could be both dangerous and costly. Since masters and overseers recorded information on slave names and family patterns, and generally did allow some choice of marriage partner, they possibly had learned as much about the lives of the slaves, as the slaves ability to observe masters, their families, and their workers, gave them similar information, useful for many of the slaves' purposes. The importance that masters placed on positive work incentives was often considerable, and some similarities among slave societies can be seen in comparing Xenophon's instructions to his estate manager, with those of the nineteenth-century planters to their overseers. Both also point to some clear relations between the incentives for slaves and those for free labor.<sup>76</sup>

Another issue concerns the distinctions often made between those who have been regarded as black and those, such as mulattos, with some perceived degree of whiteness. The distinctions made between black and mulattos are often found, not only among whites but also within the non-white population. Within slavery, mulattos tended to be given the higher occupational status, and more frequently benefited from manumissions, while after emancipation their occupation, income, and educational status were often higher as well.<sup>77</sup> Marriage patterns in the black community often seem to take note of the black-mulatto difference, while the political history of Haiti has been written on the basis of this racial distinction.<sup>78</sup>

### **VIII Concluding Remarks**

This paper has intended to survey a number of problems related to the links between slavery and racism, and the frequency of racism without slavery and slavery without racism. Either by itself would seem bad enough, although there have been enough evil events without either. Racism can generate a number of responses besides slavery and the impact of racist beliefs can vary with social, political, and economic conditions.

\* The meanings of race and racism are quite problematic, and are themselves rather controversial. Yet, as seen in this conference and elsewhere, people often use the concept of race as if there was a precise, agreed upon, meaning. Perhaps we should refer to “race as usually discussed” or “race as often defined” rather than simply race, but since those are rather cumbersome choices I will stick to the conventional usage.

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<sup>1</sup> For sweeping discussions of the pervasiveness of slavery see the many works of David Brion Davis, particularly Davis (1984), and Patterson (1982). The use of slavery as a benchmark of evil is seen in such book titles as Worse than Slavery and Less than Slaves.

<sup>2</sup> On the study of racism, see, most recently, Fredrickson (2002).



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<sup>3</sup> These issues are discussed in several of the papers presented in this conference.

<sup>4</sup> For a summary of earlier writings and a magisterial study of the link of race and slavery in the British Americas, see Jordan (1968). Williams (1944, pp.3-30) discusses “the origin of Negro slavery.” The debates are summarized in Green (1987).

<sup>5</sup> The concept of the slave as outsider is described in Finley (1980) and in Patterson (1982).

<sup>6</sup> This point is usefully made by William McKee Evans (1980).

<sup>7</sup> In the discussion of the slave trade after the Revolutionary War, the possibilities of slave or free black rebellion were raised by those arguing for ending the trade, a point made stronger in future years by the successful slave uprising in Saint Domingue. The alien immigrants to England are discussed in Cunningham (1969). See also Cooper and Thirsk (1972, pp. 746-47). The desire to limit immigration on economic grounds, on either racist or non-racist grounds, is a frequent theme in the immigration debates – past, present, and no doubt, future.

<sup>8</sup> For a discussion of role of human sacrifice in Aztec society, see, recently, Clendinnen (1991), and for human sacrifice among the Northwest Pacific Coast Indians of North America, see Donald (1977, pp. 33-35, 80-81, 165-77, and 235-37).

<sup>9</sup> For a brief history of the aborigines and summary of the white Australians treatment of aborigines, see Jupp (2001, pp.4-15, 87-162).

<sup>10</sup> See Neal (1991) for a discussion of the introduction and ending of these provisions relating to white Englishmen and women. The political treatment of convicts and ex-convicts remains a controversial issue in many other societies today. On convict labor more generally, see Shaw (1966).

<sup>11</sup> On the so-called blackbirders see, for example, Corris (1973) and Docker (1970). For an excellent introduction to movements of indentured and other labor in the South Pacific, see Clive Moore, et al (1990).

<sup>12</sup> See Lal (1983) and Gillion (1962).

<sup>13</sup> On the origins and decline of White Australia, see Yarwood (1964) and Jupp (1998, pp. 68-82, 114-31).

<sup>14</sup> See the 1912 debates in Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia (1912, pp. xx-xxi, 553-58). The report (p .xxi) argues that “the Industrial aspects of the Sugar Industry are less important than the social” so that an annual subsidy to sugar producers was desirable.

<sup>15</sup> See Karras (1988, pp. 122-63) and William D. Phillips (1985, pp. 43-65, 88-113). Serfdom as a system of labor coercion did, however, expand after this time. Freedman (1999, pp. 81-83) refers to serfdom as not replacing slavery but “supplementing it”, and discusses various differences and similarities between those forms of labor control. He points out that many of the descriptions of slaves were applied to peasants and serfs of the same color and nationality.

<sup>16</sup> See Phillips (1985, pp. 59-63)

<sup>17</sup> See Davis (2003, pp. 5-33). On Race and Slavery in the Middle East, see Lewis (1990).

<sup>18</sup> On the Barbary pirates and enslavement of Europeans, see Wolf (1979, pp. 151-73). Wolf states that “at least four hundred thousand [Christian] slaves were sold during this period [1520 to 1660] “ and “between two hundred and two hundred and fifty thousand slaves were taken in this latter period [1660-1830].” Most of these slaves were men, mainly from Spain and Italy. It is estimated (p. 225) that in 1660, “there were

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20,000 to 25,000 slaves in the regency, most of them were Spanish, Portuguese, or Italian, but the number of English, Dutch, and French slaves also ran into the hundreds, perhaps even thousands.” Later the United States government paid a ransom to redeem American captives, whose numbers apparently totaled about 700, between 1785 and 1815 (Allison, 2000, p. 107).

<sup>19</sup> For an estimate of decline of about 7.5 million in the German Empire, see Wedgwood (1938, p. 496). Parker (1996, p. 188) has the decline at 3 to 4 million.

<sup>20</sup> Wright (1965, p. 656); Wright (1965, p. 665) estimates French deaths in military service for the 17<sup>th</sup> through 19<sup>th</sup> centuries to be about 5 million, and the comparable British figure to be about 800,000, see Small and Singer (1982, pp. 89, 91). Milward (1979, pp. 210-12) claims that the number of military and civilian deaths “directly caused by the war “could have been as high as forty million, more than three times the loss in the First World War.”

<sup>21</sup> Riskin’s (1998) recent discussion of excess deaths in the famine is 15-30 million, but other estimates go as high as 40 million. Riskin discusses the political context in which the famine became so costly.

<sup>22</sup> Cornell (1979, p. 155).

<sup>23</sup> Cornell (1979, p. 156).

<sup>24</sup> Nove (1975, p. 180) states that “well over 10 million people had ‘demographically’ disappeared” between 1932 and 1939, although some of this may reflect the difficulties due to purges and collectivization.

<sup>25</sup> O’Grada (1993, p.105). As a result of the famine and the ensuing outmigration Ireland today has less than two-thirds of its pre-famine population.

<sup>26</sup> McEvedy and Jones (1978, pp. 22-24). Cornell (1979, pp. 183-184) gives a much higher worldwide estimate, and also a high estimate for European and Asian plagues between 500 and 650.

<sup>27</sup> For a recent estimate of deaths, see Restall (2003, pp. 128, 140-42). A moderate estimate of the pre-contact population of about 57 million is in Denevan (1976, pp. 289-92).

<sup>28</sup> This is based on the upward revision of the pre-contact population by Butlin (1993, pp 121-39). Butlin argues most deaths were the result of diseases. Most earlier estimates were of a lower pre-contact level and thus a lesser decline. Even then, however, it took the very rapid growth of aboriginal population after 1950 to permit the population to return to a standard estimate of the pre-contact level by 1990.

<sup>29</sup> Cornell (1979, pp. 185-86).

<sup>30</sup> Spence (1996, p. xxii) and Small and Singer (1982, p. 224)

<sup>31</sup> See Leitenberg (2003, pp. 9-11).

<sup>32</sup> See Mosse (1985) for a discussion of racism and the German behavior towards Jews, gypsies, homosexuals, and others before and during World War II, and Frderickson (2002), who points out (pp. 126-27) that Jews were only about 1 percent of the German population when Hitler came to power.

<sup>33</sup> Leitenberg (2003, p. 11-13). Leitenberg presents estimates of up to about 15 million deaths.

<sup>34</sup> Jones (1987, p. 229) This loss is estimated at about one-third of China’s population.

<sup>35</sup> Jones (1987, p. 229)

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<sup>36</sup> Morel (1920, p. 109) For a description of Morel's demographic analysis, see Louis and Stenges (1968, pp. 252-55). It is argued (pp. 269-70) that, in retrospect, King Leopold did not make great profits from his large Congo investments.

<sup>37</sup> See Clendinnen (1991, pp. 90-92), and Harner (1977). This human sacrifice was part of a ritual that some consider cannibalism, but whether for nutritional or other purposes is not clear yet. See also Shadow and Rodrigues V. (1995).

<sup>38</sup> Leitenberg (2003, pp. 47-50). These include: Angola, 1.7 million; Ethiopia, 1.25 million; Nigeria, 2.0 million; Rwanda, 1.1 million; Sudan, 2.8 million; and Zaire, 2.1 million.

<sup>39</sup> See Fieldhouse (1966, pp. 349-71), and Townsend (1930, pp. 257-304).

<sup>40</sup> Smith (1976, p. 413). The current research on the Earl of Warwick – Warwick the Kingmaker – suggests that there is some exaggeration. See Wilkinson (1964, pp. 145-53, 372) and Carpenter (1993, pp. 513-16, 625-29).

<sup>41</sup> Huggins (1990, p. 20).

<sup>42</sup> In 1970, prior to Suriname's emancipation. Maroons were taken to the parts of West Africa that their ancestors had come from for what was to be a cultural reunion. As Silvia W. de Groot (1979) points out, however, the first question from Maroons to Africans concerned why their forefathers had been sold into slavery across the ocean: "they were of the opinion that their ancestors had been taken away as slaves with the collaboration of their own brothers, and so they felt some retribution was owed them."

<sup>43</sup> See Menard (1973) and Galenson (1981).

<sup>44</sup> For a survey of laws regarding immigration, including the shift from controls limiting emigration to controls restricting immigration in the past century –and-a-half, see Engerman (2002). These shifts reflected, in part, changes in the desire for getting military service from those raised in the country.

<sup>45</sup> For Usselinx, see Mickley (1881), Locke (1901, pp. 9-10). Social homogeneity ("purity of blood" in Spanish areas) has been a frequent goal in various societies, and much of the anti-slave-trade argument in the Spanish Americas can only be described as based upon racist beliefs in setting its goals.

<sup>46</sup> See, e.g., the discussions in Locke (1901) and Adams (1908).

<sup>47</sup> Parker (1988, p. 118).

<sup>48</sup> For a discussion of voluntary slavery, see Engerman (2003). Whether slavery may, at times, be regarded as a form of social welfare system is controversial, but a trade-off between income levels and coerced labor (in this case Indian indentured labor) was noted in the rather wistful comment of the Trinidad agents in India who commented that the lack of famines in some years limited the available supply of labor. (p. 207)

<sup>49</sup> See Engerman (1995) for a description of various emancipation schemes in the New World. The lack of compensation paid slaves may have been due to the same factors as the lack of compensation paid serfs. On the ending of serfdom in Europe, mainly in the nineteenth century overlapping with the ending of slavery in the Americas, and with many similar economic and social arguments, see Blum (1978).

<sup>50</sup> Philbrick (1950, 91-92), "An Act to Prevent the Migration of Free Negroes and Mulattoes into this territory ..."

<sup>51</sup> For information on voting in the United States see Rusk (2001 particularly pp. 17-18, 33-35) and Keyssar (2000, pp. 54-59, 337-41, 351-55, 362-67).

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<sup>52</sup> See Keyssar (2000, pp. 59-60, 87-93).

<sup>53</sup> DeBow (1854, pp. 80-81, 191). The summary presented is based on occupations “considered as requiring education.” Within the south mulattos tended to own more real estate than did blacks.

<sup>54</sup> For discussions of Greek slavery with analogies to points often made about the U.S. South, see Cartledge (1985, 1998).

<sup>55</sup> See Cell (1982) and Williamson (1984). Drescher (1990) relates the reactions to what happens after slavery ended to the expansion of scientific racism. See also Myrdal (1944) on the conflict between general American ideals and racial beliefs as a source of long-run changes in the latter.

<sup>56</sup> On the emancipation of serfs, and the various arrangements regarding landholding, see Blum (1978).

<sup>57</sup> See Bodin (1962, pp. 45-46) and Condorcet (1999). Similar arguments were made in most cases of slave emancipation which provided for periods of apprenticeship, such as the 1821 emancipation plan by The American Convention for Promoting the Abolition of Slavery stating that the “mental degradation of slavery”, means that “the slave must pass through a state of pupilage and minority, to fit him for the engagement and exercise of rational liberty”. Zdrok-Ptaszek, (2002, pp. 39-44).

There are several different aspects to the emancipation process that are of interest. First, generally the slave trade was ended 25-50 years before the ending of slavery, whether for domestic political or other reasons. Second, gradual emancipation schemes took several different forms, depending upon beliefs regarding the destructiveness of slavery. In some cases those already enslaved had to wait a specified time period before their freedom; in others enslavement of the already enslaved could continue, but new-borns were not to be considered enslaved (despite long work requirements) so that they could grow up without being forced to confront the impact of enslavement.

<sup>58</sup> See also the original manuscript for the emancipation of Russian serfs in 1861, which described “peasants unprepared for [abolition], so two years were required for ‘complete freedom.’.” See Cracraft (1994, pp. 340-43).

<sup>59</sup> See Kousser (1974), Margo (1985), Oubre (1978), and Higgs (1977).

<sup>60</sup> See Tolnay and Beck (1995) and Brundage (1993).

<sup>61</sup> See Brundage (1993, p.8)

<sup>62</sup> On the importance of the shifting pattern of southern race relations after 1890, see Woodward (1955, 1971). See also Rabinowitz (1978) on the dramatic shifts in postbellum southern race relations.

<sup>63</sup> See the sources cited in footnote 59.

<sup>64</sup> See Rusk (2001, pp. 17-19, 34-35) and Keyssar (2000, pp. 141-46, 362-67)

<sup>65</sup> See Williamson (1984)

<sup>66</sup> See, e.g. Sowell (1981), for a discussion of this question.

<sup>67</sup> See Helg (1995, pp. 193-226) and de la Fuente (2001) for a perspective on Afro-Cuban conditions in the twentieth-century

<sup>68</sup> For this, see Engerman (2003).

<sup>69</sup> See Engerman (1982, 2000).

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<sup>70</sup> See Northrup (1995).

<sup>71</sup> See Eltis (1997).

<sup>72</sup> See Leyburn (1941), Redpath (1970), and Nicholls (1979, pp. 5-147). This provision was revised with the constitution of 1918, during the American occupation. Redpath (pp. 65-92) prints the 1846 Constitution, which follows the basic provisions regarding restrictions on white ownership, then or in the future, and rights to citizenship, from earlier constitutions.

<sup>73</sup> For a favorable comparative view of Spanish slavery in the Americas relative to that of the British and French, see Tannenbaum (1946).

<sup>74</sup> See Douglass (1987), for useful descriptions of , among other things, urban slavery and the psychological impact of slavery

<sup>75</sup> On Thistlewood, for some rather unusual insights into Jamaican slavery, see Hall (1989) and Burnard (2004).

<sup>76</sup> On incentives in Greek slavery, see Engerman (2002a). A useful source for the U.S. is Breeden (1980).

<sup>77</sup> For the nature of skilled occupations filled by mulattos in Trinidad slavery, see Fogel (1989, pp. 45-52) and for the breakdown of occupations and manumission by color in the British West Indies, see Higman (1984, pp. 94-99; 383-85). All studies indicate that among Southern U.S. slaves, mulattos was favored in regard to occupations and opportunities for manumissions so that the free black population was disproportionately mulatto. For the late nineteenth and early twentieth century U.S. discussions see Reuter (1969) and Hershberg and Williams (1981), which cites an important, but as yet unpublished, paper by Laurence Glascoe.

<sup>78</sup> See Leyburn (1941) and Rotberg (1971).

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